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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
-----------
-------------------
STATE OF UTAH, in the 
interest of DOUGLAS REX 
IZATT, a person under 
eighteen years of age. 
Case No. 14576 
BRIEF OF SHELDON J. IZATT 
NATURAL FATHER AND RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellants, Ben and Janet Stowell, together with the 
maternal grandmother of the child in question, Ina Hellstrom, 
now deceased, petitioned the District Juvenile Court in and 
for Salt Lake County, for a determination that the child in 
question, Douglas Rex Izatt, was dependant or neglected under 
the laws of the State of Utah, that the Juvenile Court as-
sume jurisdiction over said child, remove the child from the 
custody of his natural father, Respondent, Sheldon J, Izatt, 
and award custody to Petitioners; said Petition was subse-
quently amended, with the approval of the Court, to include 
a prayer for the termination of all parental rights of the 
natural father, Respondent herein. Petitioners, in their 
statement of the nature of the case, refer to a Writ of Habeas 
Corpus proceeding in the Third Judicial District Court in 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah; however, Respondent 
takes issue with the inclusion of that Habeas Corpus pro-
ceeding in this appeal as more fully set forth in his ar-
gument herein. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Juvenile Court made and entered its Order on the 
1st day of December, 1975, dismissing with prejudice a 
portion of Petitioners-Appellants' Petition; and on the 20th 
day of April, 1976 entered its Order dismissing with pre-
judice the remainder of said Petition. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks aff irmance of the partial and 
final orders of dismissal entered in the Juvenile Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Respondent does not controvert paragraph 1 of 
Appellants' Statement of Facts but would add thereto that 
the natural father, Respondent herein, was granted reasonable 
rights of visitation in the divroce action referred to by 
Appellant. (Tr. 236). 
2, Respondent does not controvert paragraph 2 of 
Appellants' Statement of Facts but would add thereto that 
on the 25th day of February, 1975, after the death of the 
child's natural mother, Judith H. Izatt, Ina Hellstrom, one 
of the original Petitioners and the mother of the Appellant, 
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Janet Stowell, took possession of the child and refused to 
deliver the child over to his natural father, Sheldon J. 
Izatt, either for visitation or custody, (Tr. 237). The 
Petitioner-Appellants, upon acquiring possession of the 
minor child, did file on the 28th day of February, 1975 a 
Petition in the District Juvenile Court in and for Salt Lake 
County, for adjudication of dependency and/or neglect and 
award of custody. On the basis of that Petition and without 
hearing, Ina Hellstrom was granted temporary custody of the 
minor child in question, Douglas Rex Izatt. (Tr. 239-242). 
3. Respondent does not controvert the facts as set 
forth in paragraph 3 of Appellants' Statement of Facts. 
4. Respondent does not controvert paragraph 4 of 
Appellants' Statement of Facts. Respondent would add to 
said paragraph 4 to reflect the objections to the Petition 
for the adjudication of dependency and/or neglect and award 
of custody as filed by the natural father, (Tr. 236-238), to 
wit: 
(4) That as of the death of Judith H. Izatt, mother 
of the child, on February 25, 1975, Sheldon J. Izatt 
has the legal right to custody and control of his 
child Douglas Rex Izatt; further, that on February 
25 1975 Ina Hellstrom, one of the Petitioners herein, 
did without legal right, take possession of the child, 
and, did refuse to deliver said child over to his nat-
ural father, Sheldon J. Izatt, either for visitation 
purposes or custody. 
(5) With the exception of the alleged delinquency in 
child support, the exact amount of which Sheldon J. 
Izatt is not certain at this time, Sheldon J. Izatt 
-3-
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denies the allegations inferring neglect contained 
within the Petition on file herein, and affirmatively 
alleges that the allegation contained within paragraph 
5 of the Petition to the effect that he was living 
with a woman to which he was not married, is libelous, 
inflamatory and without basis of fact. 
(6) That subsequent to the death of Judith H. Izatt, 
he has remarried, is currently residing with his 
spouse at 5645 South 4270 West, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
and is ready, willing and able to provide a home for 
his son, Douglas Rex Izatt. 
5. With respect to the facts as set forth in paragraph 
I 
5 of the Appellants' Statement of Facts, Respondent does not 
dispute the same other than to take the position that the 
Writ of Habeas Corpus referred to herein was not part of the 
Juvenile Court action, dismissal of which Appellants' appeai ' 
but was filed by Respondent, Sheldon J. Izatt, in the Third 
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County in an 
attempt to regain temporary custody of the minor child. 
6. Respondent does not controvert the facts as set fort~ 
in paragraph 6 of Appellants' Statement of Facts. 
7. Respondent does not controvert the facts as set fortr 
in paragraph 7 of Appellants' Statement of Facts. I 
8. Respondent does not controvert the facts as set forth 
in paragraph 8 of Appellants' Statement of Facts but the 
quote cited by Appellants should be clarified by pointing out I 
that the quote cited by Appellants was a comment by the 
Court directed to arguments of counsel as to the affect of 
the Order in the Habeas Corpus proceedings as set forth in 
-4-
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paragraph 7 of Appellants' Statement of Facts and that after 
argument by counsel the Court did make the statement; 
''Well, as a number one item we had better litigate the 
Petition. If there is no neglect shown on the part of 
the father then it seems to me that I would dismiss this 
Petition. Then maybe we had better wait until we get 
the Order from the District Court, but we can respond 
to that after we get the Petition out of the way". 
(Tr. page 17 lines2-7). 
9. Respondent does not controvert the facts as set forth 
in Appellants' paragraph 9 but would point out that the 
transcript reflects an Order by the Court to allow visitation 
by the natural father, Respondent herein, on a weekly basis 
(Tr. 25), but does not reflect that visitation was in fact 
allowed by Petitioners and Appellants. 
10. Respondent does not controvert the facts as set 
forth in Appellants' paragraph 10. 
11. Respondent does not controvert the facts as set 
forth in Appellants' paragraph 11. 
12. Respondent does not controvert the facts as set 
forth in Appellants' paragraph 12 with the exception of 
clarifying from the record the statements of the Court and 
counsel for Respondent regarding the visitation by the mater-
nal aunt and uncle as follows (Tr. 208): 
Judge Larsen: " ••• I think the maternal relatives have 
no rights to see the child. It might 
be important that the child go to Disney-
land but that would not be an issue in 
this case. 
-5-
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Mr. Schwabe: If I may speak, Your Honor, to the issue, 
As I recall the Court suggested it. It 
was my legal opinion of which I advised 
my clients the duty (while the transcripts 1 
show "the duty to", it should read that 
due to) the obfiscatory tactics and the 
antics and the spurious allegations made 
by Petitioners and the now deceased grand- 1 
mother, that it would be best for their 
interests and the child's interests to re-
tain (retain should read refuse) any visi-
tation. 
13. Regarding the facts as set forth in paragraph 13 cf 
Appellants' Statement of Facts, Respondent does not contra-
vert the same. 
14. Respondent does not controvert the facts as set 
forth in paragraph 14 of Appellants' Statement of Facts but 
would add the dialogue from the hearing as follows (Tr. 74): 
Judge Larsen: Mr. Goodwill, you have the burden of 
going forward. 
Mr. Goodwill: We call Sheldon Izatt as our first witness. 
Mr. Izatt is not here, Your Honor. 
Mr. Schwobe: Your Honor, it is my understanding that 
the purpose of this hearing today was 
for Mr. Goodwill to put on his case. 
Mr. Goodwill: He is a witness in my case. 
Judge Larsen: Did you subpoena him? 
Mr. Goodwill: No, but he is a party. Parties are 
obligated to attend. The only one that 
had an excuse was the wife, we had no 
knowledge or notice that he wouldn't be 
here. 
Mr. Schwobe: I talked with Mr. Goodwill the night befcr 
last, Your Honor, and he made no desire 
for Mr. Izatt to be here. Mr. Izatt has 
-6-
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a job and I don't feel he needs this 
emotiona~ upset. It is our duty to put 
on no evidence today. 
Judge Larsen: Do you want to be heard on this one? 
Mr. Stead: No. 
Judge Larsen: I don't know that he was required to be 
here as long as he is represented by 
counsel. Ordinarily the father is here, 
but I suggest you go on to your next 
witness and subpoena him. 
Mr. Schwabe: Mr. Izatt will certainly be here to 
present his own defense. I had no 
notice ---
Judge Larsen: Well, I suppose if Mr. Goodwill wanted 
him here as a witness he could subpoena 
him and require him here at the main case. 
Mr. Stead: I know of no rule that would compel him 
to be here. 
Mr. Goodwill: We will call Mrs. Sudbury. (Tr. 75). 
15. Respondent does not controvert the facts as set 
forth in paragraph 15 of the Appellants' Statement of Facts 
but would point out that said facts are more properly couched 
as argument and will be responded to within Respondent's 
argument. 
16. Respondent does not controvert the facts as set 
forth in Appellants' paragraph 16 with the exception that 
Petitioners' Amended Petition, insofar as tho~ allegations 
contained within paragraph 1 (a) through 1 (c) under Conduct 
and (a) through (c) under Condition, was continued to the 
15th day of December, 1975. Appellants filed no timely appeal 
from this Order dismissing with prejudice a portion of their 
Amended Petition. 
-7-
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17. With regard to the facts as set forth in Appellants' 
paragraph 17, Appellants do not correctly reflect the facts 
concerning the April 15th hearing (Tr. 197-198). Attorney for 
Respondent had previously set a motion to dismiss the remain-
ing portion of Appellants' Petition on the 12th day of April, 
and the remainder of the trial had previously been set for 
the 15th day of April; due to illness of Attorney for Petition<: 
Appellants, the Motion to Dismiss was continued from the 12th 
day of April to the 15th day of April and the trial previously 
set on the 15th day of April was striken, counsel for Peti-
tioners did not appear on the 15th day of April for the pur-
pose of completing his case in chief but only on the motion 
for dismissal by Respondent. (Tr. 197-198), as follows: 
Judge Larson: Well, now, Mr. Goodwill, this date was 
set for hearing two or three days ago 
when you called up and asked to have 
it continued. 
Mr. Goodwill: Because I was incapacitated your Honor. 
Judge Larson: And you were advised it would be con-
sidered today. I don't know who told 
you you couldn't put on any evidence. 
You were told that you couldn't ... 
that the court wouldn't consider at 
this time the main case, I would guess. 
Mr. Goodwill: We were told that it was set for trial 
today, your Honor, we were told that 
the trial date was stricken. The only 
matter I couldn't speak with your Honor 
I asked and I was told that I would not 
be able to and I was told that it was 
striken from the trial calendar and that 
the only motion would be Mr. Schwobe's 
motion to dismiss. 
-8-
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18. Regarding the facts set forth by Petitioners in 
paragraph 18 Respondent does not controvert the facts set 
forth therein; however, in that the facts are presented in 
argumentative style they will be responded to in argument as 
opposed to in the Statement of Facts. 
A R G U M E N T 
POINT I 
THE ORDER OF PARTIAL DISMISSAL OF PETITIONERS' AMENDED 
PETITION DATED DECEMBER 1, 1975 WAS A FINAL ORDER FROM WHICH 
APPEAL WAS NOT TIMELY TAKEN. 
On the 17th day of October, 1975, Petitioners' Amended 
Petition came on for hearing for the purpose of Petitioners 
presenting their case, with Respondent, the natural father, 
Sheldon J. Izatt to present his case at a later time when the 
Court had time available to hear the same. At the end of the 
hearing on October 17th, counsel for Respondent made a motion 
to dismiss Petitioners' Amended Petition, which motion, after 
argument, was taken under advisement by the Court (Tr. 176-181), 
and was subsequently granted in part on the 1st day of Dec-
ember, 1975. (Tr. 218-219). The Court in its Order of Dis-
missal on December 1st, 1975 did dismiss with prejudice that 
portion of Petitioners' Amended Petition contained within 
paragraphs 1 (a) through 1 (c). Those portions dismissed 
with prejudice read as follows, (Tr. 223): 
1 0 That Sheldon J. Izatt is unfit and/or incompetent 
by reasons of conduct or condition seriously detri-
mental to the child as follows: 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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part: 
CONDUCT 
(a) The father has neglected and/or abused 
the child physically on more than one occasion 
(b) The father's conduct is both amoral and · 
asocial. 
(c) The father has set an example of prevari-
cation, immorality and vulgarity, which is ser-
iously detrimental to the welfare of the child. 
Section 55-10-112 (U.C.A. 1953, as amended), states in 
" an appeal to the Supreme Court may be taken from 
any order, decree or judgment in the Juvenile Court. 
Such appeal should be taken in the same manner as which 
appeals are taken from judgments or decrees in District 
Court. The appeal must be taken within one (1) month 
from the entry of the order, decree or judgment ap-
pealed from". 
The Notice of Appeal filed in this matter by Petitioners 
(Tr. 215), was not in fact filed until the 29th day of April, 
1976, and then only applied to the Order of Dismissal entered 
the 1st day of December, 1975, and was a final order dis-
missing with prejudice a substantial portion of Petitioners' 
Amended Petition. The postition of Respondent is that it 
is improper at this time for Petitioners to request that this 
Honorable Court reverse the Lower Court and its Order of 
Partial Dismissal entered the 1st day of December, 1975 for 
the reasons that there has never been a filing of a Notice 
of Appeal from that Order or a preservation of a right to 
appeal on the Order until a final determination of other 
claims as provided for in Rule 72 (a), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Therefore, the Courts' Order of Dece~ber 1st, 
1975 should be affirmed. 
-10-
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In addition to the foregoing the Court was well within 
the discretion accorded to it by Section 55-10-84 (U.C.A. 
1953, as amended), which provides"the Court may dismiss 
a petition at any stage of the proceedings," and Rule 23 
Utah State Juvenile Court Rules of Practice and Procedure 
which provides: 
time during, or at the con-
to t e c i i sue 
action is in t e interest o Justice an t e welfare 
of the child, and the Court shall dismiss any peti-
tion which has not been proven, (emphasis added). 
The Court when entering its Order of Partial Dismissal had 
heard all of the Petitioners' evidence relative to those 
items dismissed with the exception of the testimony of the 
natural father, Sheldon J. Izatt, Respondent herein. Respond-
ent's presence had not been supoenaed by Petitioners prior 
to the hearing on October 17th, 1975 nor had requests been 
made of Respondent's counsel to have Respondent present at 
that hearing. It certainly was well within the discretion 
of the Lower Court to draw a conclusion upon the evidence 
that Petitioners had brought forth on October 17th, 1975 
that the likelyhood of Petitioners being able to ellict 
information from the natural father, your Respondent, to 
prove the allegations contained within paragraph 1 (a) 
through 1 (c) was not sufficiently great to require add-
itional hearings at the expense of forcing the father, your 
-11-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Respondent, to present defense to allegations which were 
unfounded. 
POINT II 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERROR IN GRANTING RESPONDENT'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS THE REMAINDER OF PETITIONERS' AMENDED 
PETITION 
As set forth in Point I above, 55-10-84 (U.C.A. 1953, 
as amended), and Rule 23 Utah State Juvenile Court Rules 
of Practice and Procedure, provides that the Court may dis-
miss a Petition at any stage of the proceedings. The posi-
tion of Respondent is that the rule and the statute upon 
which the rule was based is controlling in this matter as 
the said rule and statute have exclusive application to the 
Juvenile Court system and they would certainly supercede 
Rule 41, U.R.C.P. as cited by attorney for Appellants. 
The Court was well within its discretion as allowed 
by 55-10-84 (U.C.A. 1953, as amended), and Rule 23 Utah 
State Juvenile Court Rules of Practice and Procedure for 
at the time of granting the Motion to Dismiss the Court had 
heard testimony of Petitioners' expert, Dr. Cutler, regarding 
the remaining allegations in the Petition concerning "con-
dition" (Tr. 223-224), as well as the testimony of Helen 
Marie Nelson, social services worker with the Division of 
Family Services, (Tr. 198-208). Petitioners in their Brief, 
discuss at some length that they were denied the opportunity 
to present the testimony of their expert witness, Dr. Victor 
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B. Cline, regarding the alleged condition of threatened 
castration; however, upon questioning by the Court, counsel 
for Petitioners was not able to proffer any proof as to the 
threatened castration other than that the child in question, 
who was three (3) years old at the time, was shown a knife 
by the examiner and was asked what it was for. The child 
then made a statement to the effect that it was for my 
mommy to cut my thing off. The dialogue between the Court 
and counsel for Appellants in reference to that proffer is 
as follows, (Tr. 193-194): 
Judge Larson: 
Mr. Goodwill: 
Judge Larson: 
Mr. Goodwill: 
Judge Larson: 
Mr. Goodwill: 
Judge Larson: 
Let me ask you, is the statment of the 
boy made to Dr. Kline, I presume, is 
that the basis of your claim that this 
statement was made? 
That's right. 
Is there any claim 
And we would also like thecpportunity, 
Your ---
Is there any claim that it was made on 
more than one occasion? 
No. We haven't finished our case, 
Your Honor, and I'd also like the 
opportunity ---
I understand that 
Mr. Goodwill: May I finish? I'd like the opportunity 
Judge Larson: Just a ~inute, Mr. Goodwill. I was 
asking you a question. If you were 
permitted to put on your case are you 
aoing to be able to show any more than 
that in relation to this? 
-13-
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Mr. Goodwill: I don't know what the mother is going 
to say. I've never had an opportunity 
to put her on, but she is one of my 
witnesses. She may admit it. She may 
admit it on more than one occasion. I 
think to bring this motion prematurely 
Judge Larson: Well, are you suggesting then that when 
the case is tried you are going to call 
her and then you'll find out what was 
said? Why do we have to go to trial to 
find that out? 
In light of the report and testimony of the social 
worker, Mrs. Nelson, the substance of which was that after 
residing with his natural father for more than one (1) year, 
the child was getting along very well, and in light of 
the testimony of the witnesses of Petitioners already be-
fore the Court, it is the position of Respondent that the 
Court was well within its discretion and was acting in the 
best interest of the child in dismissing the Petition. At 
the time of the April 15th hearing, the child had been in 
the home of his natural father for in excess of one (1) 
year. At the present time the child has been in the home 
of his natural father in excess of two (2) years. It was 
the fear of the Court that the very continuation of the 
proceeding could be detrimental to the child, (Tr. 196), 
and the Court was acting in the child's best interests, as 
allowed by 55-10-84 (U.C.A. 1953, as amended), and Rule 23 
Utah State Juvenile Court Rules of Practice and Procedure 
when he dismissed the Amended Petition. The Court in making 
its ruling stated: 
-14-
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Judge Larson: Anything further from anyone? As the 
court looks at this, this has gone on 
quite a long while. Course the court 
does not approve any statements that 
may have been made to this child threa~ 
ening castration, it seems to me that 
the matter that has to be looked at 
here is if this were to be proven, that 
a trial of this case, what would be the 
projected harm? Now we do have Dr. 
Cutler's report in evidence. I think 
that the best Dr. Cutler could do is 
say yes this is harmful. This has 
been threatened to a lot of people and 
it may have been harmful to some and 
not harmful to others. I think that 
looking at it in the light most favor-
able to the petitioners, the most it 
would be a matter of conjecture as to 
what harm this would do the child. And 
then, of course, if it was considered 
to get harmful whether it was sufficient 
harmful on which to base the jurisdic-
tion of the court. It seems to me like 
we're working with a pretty obscure 
kind of comment that was made by a young 
boy to a psychologist. I don't know 
how you call the boy to the witness 
stand, probably call him to the witness 
would be more harmful than any statement 
that may have been made to him, in fact. 
Now there has been quite a bit made of 
the question of the divurgence of mental 
abilities here between members of this 
presently constituted family. Court has 
just about every day dealt with families 
where there was a divurgence of mental 
ability. There is a case on appeal in 
this court right now where the mother had 
an extremely low IQ, much lower than any-
thing considered here, almost to the 
state of her being a vegetable. I felt 
in that case that the ability of the 
mother was a condition upon which the 
mother should be deprived of custody. I 
think it was a cruel act that the court 
was aksed to perform. I've no idea whether 
the Supreme Court will sustain me or not, 
but my point is that even in that kind of 
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situation, as far as I was concerned 
it was very questionable. We had to 
weigh a lot of equities, and of course 
this case is not anywhere near that. So 
I don't think there is anything there. ' 
Now, that leaves the question of the 
father's hostility. I've read Dr. Cutler's 
report on this and he does indicate that 
the father does have some explosive 
capabilities. Nothing in the report sug-
gests that those explosive capabilities 
would result in any harm to this child. 
Now, I suppose if the stress situation 
was such that this might be a result, 
but here again we're just conjecturing. 
The motion to dismiss is granted. 
(Tr. 209-210). 
POINT III 
THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS FILED IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BY THE NATURAL FATHER, RESPONDENT HEREIN, AND THE ORDER 
ISSUED UPON THE HEARING OF SAID WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS IS 
NOT PART OF THIS ACTION AND HAS NO EFFECT UPON THE JUVENILE 
COURT'S DISMISSAL OF THE PETITIONERS' AMENDED PETITION ON 
FILE HEREIN. 
As the Writ of Habeas Corpus issued in the Third Judi-
cial District Court in and for the County of Salt Lake, State 
of Utah, in the matter of Sheldon J. Izatt vs. Ina Hellstrom, 
Civil No. 226267, on the 10th day of March, 197~ was not 
and is not a part of the action filed by Petitioners in the 
Juvenile Court and is not a matter of record in this proceeding, 
Respondent objects to the attempt by Appellants to utilize 
said action as a means of appeal from the Order dismissing 
their Petition in the Juvenile Court. Furthe~ the Writ of 
Habeas Corpus action is now moot for the reason that the 
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person against whom the Writ was directed, Ina Hellstrom, 
(the Respondent therein) is now deceased and was deceased 
prior to dismissal of Appellants' Amended Petition. 
POINT IV 
THE APPOINTMENT OF MR. JOHN SOLTIS ON APRIL 15th, 1976 
AS GUARDIAN AD LITEM FOR THE CHILD WAS NOT ERROR, 
On April 15th, 1976 the matter did not come on for 
trial as set forth in the Brief of Appellants but only for 
the purpose of ruling on Respondent's Motion to Dismiss 
the remainder of Appellants' Amended Petition. This fact 
was acknowledged by counsel for Appellants (Tr. page 197 
linffi 29-32, page 198 lines 1-2); 
Mr. Goodwill: We were told that it was set for trial 
today, Your Honor, and we were told 
that that trial date was striken. The 
only matter I couldn't speak with your 
Honor I asked and I was told that I 
would not be able to and I was told 
that it was striken from the trial 
calendar and that the only motion would 
be Mr. Schwobe's motion to dismiss. 
At the time of April 15th, 1976, Mr. Stead who had been pre-
viously appointed attorney and guardian ad litem for the child 
had left his employment with the County Attorney's office 
and his work load had been taken over by John Soltis. Over 
the objection of Petitioners the Court appointed Mr. John 
Soltis guardian ad litem for the child (Tr. 182). Petiticrers 
argue this appointment to be reversible error on the grounds 
that Mr. Soltis was appointed without notice to Petitioners 
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that he had apparently had conversation with Attorney for 
Respondent prior to the hearing, and lastly that he was not 
sufficiently familiar with the facts of this case to join 
in Respondent's Motion to Dismiss. As set forth in Appel-
lants' Brief 55-10-96 U.C.A. (1953, as amended), provides: 
The Court may appoint counsel without such request 
if it deems representation is necessary to protect 
the child. 
Apparently the Court did not feel that it was necessary 
to appoint Mr. Soltis as the attorney for the child but it 
did feel it necessary to appoint him as guardian ad litem. 
Rule 33 Utah State Juvenile Court Rules of Practice and 
Procedure aforementioned, which Rule is based upon the 
55-10-96 u.c.A. (1953, as amended), provides in part: 
••• if the interest of the child and those of the 
party appear to conflict, or if neither parent is 
available, or if counsel is necessary to meet the 
requirements of a fair hearing, the Court shall 
a oint a uardian ad litem or counsel or both to 
protect t e interests o t e c i ed) 
It would appear under the statute and the Rule that the 
appointment of a guardian ad litem or counsel or both is 
fully within the discretion of the Court and there is not 
requirement that the Court give notice of its intention to 
appoint the same or hold a special hearing in that regard. 
It is true that in this case counsel for Respondent 
had in fact discovered that Mr. Soltis was replacing Mr. 
Stead in the County Attorney's office, and had further, spoken 
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with hi~ concerning his feelings toward the Motion to Dis-
miss. Said discovery and contact took place only as the 
result of counsel for Respondent's preparation for his 
Motion to Dismiss and it must be assumed that had Appellants 
or Appellants' counsel checked with the County Attorney's 
office to determine the position of the appointed represent-
ative of the child prior to the Motion, Appellants would have 
been apprised of the same information as was counsel for the 
Respondent. 
It is apparent from the record that Mr. Soltis had 
in fact prepared himself prior to the April 15th, 1976, hearing 
in light of his informal replacement of Mr. Stead and antic-
ipating that he would be appointed to represent the child's 
interest in some manner at the April 15th hearing. Appel-
lants in Point III of their argument contend that by virtue 
of Mr. Soltis' limited contact with the case on April 15th, 
1976 he was in no position to protect the best interests of 
the child. While Appellants would seek to hold out in their 
Brief that as of the April 15th hearing the Amended Petition 
retained an allegation that the father had abused the child, 
this Honorable Court should note that such allegation had 
been dismissed pursuant to the Court's Order of December 1st, 
1975. Therefore, it would appear from Mr. Soltis' statement 
on page 190-191 of the transcript that he was familiar with 
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the case and had in fact spent a substantial amount of time 
preparing for and familiarizing himself with the Motion 
coming before the Court on April 15th, 1976. It must be 
remembered that Mr. Soltis' participation in the case was 
at the instance of an Order of the Juvenile Court and that 
the burden was not upon Mr. Soltis to act as the trier of 
fact with regard to Appellants' Petition, but his state~ent 
was simply part of the information taken into consideration 
by the Court in dismissing the Petition. Mr. Soltis stated, 
(Tr. 190-191): 
I would like to comment Your Honor. Referring to 
the statute 55-10-99 that Mr. Schwobe made reference 
to, permanent deprivation is laid out in petitioners 
petition those to conduct or condition, not to be 
repetitive but that the parent or parents are unfit 
or incompetent by reason of conduct or condition 
seriously detrimental to the child. I have person-
ally met with the child, with Marie Nelson, for a 
period of about an hour, I talked to the child and 
tried to become friends and tried to gather as much 
information from the child as I coud, based on his 
age in the company of Miss Nelson, so I do have an 
opinion as to the care of the child and the present 
condition of the child. And I have been apprised by 
Miss Nelson that the child has been with the parents 
for a considerable period of time also. Leaving that 
separate and apart and directing our attention to 
the petition itself, the conduct that is alleged, I 
was not at the other hearings, this is true and I 
know nothing of the threats of the mother, if they 
were made. The conduct as alleged as to the cas-
tration threats to the boy seem to be the only basis 
of conduct that the petitioner is seeking to estab-
lish for permanent deprivation. In the alternative, 
to together with this stating a condition, I have 
never interviewed the father. This term toward mass-
ive hostility and the petition does not state that 
this hostility, if it does exist, has been directed 
toward the child by any specifics. More particularly 
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though, with B and C, I am concerned that a criteria 
of intelligence could be a basis for depriving people 
of a child, based on a probability that the child 
will not develop to his potential. I'm concerned 
that a man's level of intelligence could do that to 
him, could take his child from him. Coupling that 
with Miss Nelson's opinion, and my observations of 
the child, that his staying there, he has not been 
emotionally deprived or intellectually deprived. So 
I feel that intelligence could not be a condition 
that could be a basis for taking a child away from 
his natural parents, and I join Mr. Schwabe in his 
motion concerning the intellectual factors being a 
basis for taking a child away. In my capacity I 
have not, I must say, been with the parents, but I 
have questions concerning the substance alleged as 
condition or conduct as also being the basis for 
termination, and would join with them. 
C 0 N C L U S I 0 N 
The Order of Partial Dismissal and the Order dismissing 
the remainder of Petitioners' Amended Petition was fully 
within the discretion of the Juvenile Court as authorized 
by Section 55-10-84, U.C.A. (1953, as amended), and Rule 23 
Utah State Juvenile Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. 
Further, the Order of Partial Dismissal should be affirmed 
for the reason that no timely appeal was taken therefrom. The 
dismissal of Appellants' Amended Petition, which had been 
brought and prosecuted under the Juvenile Court Act, had 
no effect on the Habeas Corpus proceeding in the District 
Court and further the Habeas Corpus became moot upon the 
28th day of March, 1975, when the person against whom the 
Writ was directed, Ina Hellstrom, the maternal grandmother of 
the chil~ passed away. 
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Appellants' objection to the appointment of Mr. 
Soltis as Guardian Ad Litem is not well taken for the rea-
son that such appointment was also within the discretion of 
the Juvenile Court. 
On the 1st day of April, 1975, the Respondent, Sheldon 
J. Izatt, did receive temporary custody of his son, a son 
to which he had every legal right except for the untrue a~ 
legations made against him by Petitioners and Ina Hellstrom 
in their original Petition filed with the Juvenile Court. 
His son has resided with him continuously since that day. 
The legislature in recognizing the expertise of the 
Juvenile Court system granted that Court great discretion 
in its ability to dismiss, at any stage of the proceeding, 
petitions which may be filed with it. In this case, the 
Juvenile Court properly excerised that discretion by dis-
missing the Amended Petition and thereby affirming the 
natural father's legal right to custody of his son. 
Respondent would respectfully urge that this Honorable 
Court affirm the partial and final orders of dismissal as 
entered by the Juvenile Court and grant Respondent his costs 
as allowed by law. 
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